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Abstract
Thousands of foreign fighters originating from the Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo
have joined the ranks of ISIS, traveling to the Middle East and return with terrorist training. They
are a danger to their country of origin as well as the larger European community because they are
ideologically radicalized and often hide in plain sight until an attack has been executed. In 2014,
the number of radicalized individuals traveling to the Middle East has decreased dramatically.
Similarly, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo introduced counter-terrorism measures
around the same time to combat radicalization and increase safety. Research concerning whether
or not this decrease of foreign fighters from the Balkans stem from a decrease in the relative
power of ISIS or new counterterrorism strategies has been lacking. The research done in this
paper sought to understand why the decrease in foreign fighters occurred and whether or not the
policies implemented in the Western Balkans played a significant role in the reduction. However,
this paper is unable to determine what has caused the decrease in foreign fighters. ISIS’s decline
in power and drop in recruitment techniques occurred later than the 2013 decline in foreign
fighters. The policies enacted by national governments in the Western Balkans are too drastically
different from each other to have produced such succinct results across borders. Likewise, the
policies were enacted just before the 2014 and have not all been effective combating foreign
fighters making it unlikely that they are responsible for the decrease.
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Introduction
Foreign fighters who return from Iraq and Syria to their country of origin in the Western
Balkans are a major security threat. These individuals have become skilled in handling arms,
executing terrorist plots, and have become ideologically radicalized. Individuals of this nature do
not only pose a threat to the Western Balkans, but to member states of the European Union (EU).
These fighters have the ability to cause mass chaos and cause thousands of injuries to societies
throughout the EU because of their commitment to a global jihad. Therefore, it is necessary to
monitor, analyze and understand all developments in the foreign fighter phenomenon in the
Balkans.
Since 2012 there has been a steady decrease in radicalized individuals originating from
the Western Balkans traveling to Syria and Iraq. However, there was a sharp decline in foreign
fighters in 2014. This paper will analyze the explanations for the decrease in foreign fighters
from the Western Balkans. Specifically, this paper will address whether a decrease in foreign
fighters can be attributed to stricter and more cohesive policies at the national level, or if the
declining power and influence of ISIS monetarily and territorially that have made the perspective
of foreign fighting less appealing.

Literature Review
Foreign Fighters
The term foreign fighter is often misused to describe local rebels, terrorists, and
insurgents. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a concrete definition that establishes the
boundaries for what constitutes a foreign fighter and what does not. Some definitions say that a
foreign fighter is simply a non-citizen of a conflict zone that engages in the conflict. However,
this is not a sufficient definition because it lacks specificity. This paper will use Thomas
Hegghammer’s definition of a foreign fighter because it is both clear and exhaustive in defining
the concept of a foreign fighter. Hegghammer states that a foreign fighter
(1) has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of
the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official
military organization (Hegghammer 2010, 58).
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This definition is important because it separates foreign fighters from soldiers, mercenaries, and
any other violent actors who have crossed a border to fight on behalf of a particular group.
With this in mind, Hegghammer points out that the concept of foreign fighters is
relatively new. He argues that the notion, and overall importance, of foreign fighters was lost
among academics because of an emphasis on local rebels and international terrorists until the
1980s. Most academic literature, prior to the 1980s, focuses on foreign state support, exiled
insurgents, or local rebels rather than the influence of independent global activists in the form of
foreign fighters. Studies on foreign fighters, more recently, focus largely on their influence with
Al-Qaeda. Most literature does not speak of them as a larger phenomenon, especially in the
Western Balkans. Therefore, there is a gap within the academic literature that this paper will fill.
Hegghammer focuses his research on foreign fighters in conflicts within Muslim
territories. Specifically, foreign fighters in Muslim territories represent “a violent offshoot of a
qualitatively new sub-current of Islamism – populist pan-Islamism” (Hegghammer 2010, 56).
Therefore, they are targeted through recruitment strategies that are framed as a way for Muslim
nations to fight an “existential external threat” (Hegghammer 2010, 73). For example, conflicts
where crimes are being committed against Muslims, such as women being raped, children and
elderly killed, and mosques destroyed best motivates foreign fighters within the Muslim
community. In this type of scenario, Muslims must fight back militarily because Islamic law
commands it (Hegghammer 2010). The responsibility to defend Muslim territory is shared by all
Muslims, and not limited to the residents of the contested and conflicted area. Specifically, there
are two types of arguments that support the call for solitary in action among Muslims to unite
against a common threat. The first emphasizes the unity of the Muslim nation. Victims are
systematically referred to as “our brothers/sisters/mothers/children” as if they were blood
relations of the prospective recruits. The second argument invokes Islamic law1, declaring that
fighting is an individual religious duty (fard ayn) for all Muslims (Heggammer 2010, 74).
Through the discussion of the literature, we are better able to analyze how foreign fighters,
particularly of Muslim descent, are recruited in conflicts throughout the world.
Groups requiring foreign manpower must advertise, persuade and enlist foreigners to
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Also known as Sharia, or Sharia law, it is the religious law that defines the Islamic religious
tradition. The laws cover a wide range of topics and correspond with living life in accordance to
God’s will.
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fight for their cause. Similar to Hegghammer, David Malet argues that recruitment tactics are
most successful when distant civil conflicts seem like a threat to the transnational community
that the potential recruit is associated. Malet argues that specific characteristics, such as
belonging to a specific religion or ethnicity, are related to transnational recruiting because it
brings the recruiter closer to the prospective involvement in an armed conflict. Arguably, the root
causes that justify fighting and killing are subjective. Consequently, recruiters must tailor their
argument in a way for an individual to preserve their distant community, through defensive
action, rather than individual gain. Recruitment strategies usually follow a similar pattern (Malet
2009).
As recruiters tailor their recruitment strategies to reflect the goal of saving a shared
community, they must understand what groups they are trying to target. In order to make a
connection with potential recruits, they must identify their cause in relation to the potential
foreign fighters. At this time, individuals who are
highly active in the institutions of that community (that has been previously identified by
the insurgent group) and identify with it closely, but who tend to be marginalized within
their broader polities, often because they are part of some minority group often
participate as a foreign fighter (Malet 2009, 14).
Again, recruiters must emphasize the potential threat to transnational communities in order to
gain recruits. Recruiters do their best to persuade potential recruits that their participation (as
foreign fighters) is “necessary for the survival of their people, and ultimately, their own” (Malet
2009, 15).
ISIS Foreign Fighters
As of December 2015, nearly 30,000 foreign fighters joined the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), also known as, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or by the Arabic
acronym, Da’esh. These fighters come from 85 different countries, the majority from the Middle
East (Bakker 2013). However, foreign fighters also come from the Western world including the
European Union and the United States. Fighters from the Western Balkans represent a threat to
the international community for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, they present a major
security threat to the Western world because foreign fighters possess government-issued
passports. Therefore, they can easily return home from combat as a trained terrorist and go
unnoticed by government authorities. Once they have returned home, foreign fighters have
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connections and skills to create new terror networks in the West and successfully execute
attacks. Without foreign fighters, ISIS and other terrorist groups would not have the human
capital needed to commit attacks on foreign soil (Benmelech and Klor 2017). ISIS recruits from
Western countries serve an extremely important purpose. These fighters help to create animosity
between the Western population and Muslim immigrants who have settled there, thereby
perpetuating the cultural conflict. ISIS focuses their recruitment strategies in Western countries
on impressionable youth through social media propaganda (Benmelech and Klor 2017).
Benmelech and Klor’s research has shown that poor economic conditions alone do not
drive individuals of the Western world to participate in ISIS. In fact, in many cases, individuals
who become ISIS foreign fighters originate from a country that has a positive GDP and Human
Development Index (HDI). Countries with the highest foreign fighter recruits have high levels of
economic development, low inequality, developed political institutions, and stability (Benmelech
and Klor 2017). However, the size of a country’s Muslim population, in relation to a country’s
homogeneity, does have a strong correlation to the number of foreign fighters. Muslim
immigrants experience more trouble assimilating into countries that are more homogenous. In
these homogenous countries, they experience higher levels of discrimination, which in turn,
strengthens their religious identity and can lead to easier radicalization (Benmelech and Klor
2017). Muslims, either first or second generation, who fail to integrate or assimilate into their
homogenous western country, often radicalize. During this radicalization process, individuals
may move to Syria and Iraq for a short period of time. After, they move back to their country of
origin as foreign fighters willing and able to commit and attack on their country of origin
(Benmelech and Klor 2017, 4). Overall, marginalized individuals are recruited through
nonviolent, intentional Islamic organizations that emphasize the threat to Islam and Muslim faith
throughout the world.

Background Information
ISIS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its network of like-minded members have
carried out hundreds of attacks, both on the large and small scale, and traumatized many
societies throughout the world. ISIS marks a new era of terrorism and global security threats not
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only to neighboring Arab countries, but also to the United States (U.S.) and the European Union.
This objective makes them different from organizations like Al Qaeda, who focused their
attention on the “near enemies” like Iraq and Syria (Knapp 2017). Instead, ISIS focuses on “the
far enemy,” also known as, the Western world. ISIS stationed itself in Mosul, Iraq’s second
largest city.
Previously, the U.S., the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) was able to
block further advancements of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda by blocking funds. However, ISIS
was too economically independent. By the mid-2014 ISIS was the strongest it had ever been
because of its economic capabilities. The jihadi group was able to smuggle oil out of countries
like Iraq and Syria, and into Jordan, which gave them ample amounts of financial revenue
(Knapp 2017). The total revenue from smuggled oil totaled somewhere between one and
three million per day. The group also controlled a large taxed population of nearly eight
million people where they are able to tax “everything from small family farms to large
enterprises such as cell-phone service providers, water delivery companies, and electric utilities”
(Cronin 2015, 35). Additionally, ISIS gained income from grain stories, and thousands of arms
and ammunition (Cronin 2015, 35).
In order to sustain its power, ISIS needed further conquest, new recruits (to replace those
lost) and arms. ISIS was unable to gain more territory because, as a Sunni Arab force, they were
unable to conquer Shia terrain in central and southern Iraq (Burke 2017). After ISIS lost control
of Mosul in July 2017, the leadership and administration of ISIS crumbled. The creation and
distribution of propaganda that ISIS had relied so heavily on to attract new fighters had dropped
by two-thirds, and by September 2017, it completely stopped. ISIS was unable to offer anything
to recruits other than a place among the violence and destruction. U.S.-led airstrikes and Western
forces have done well at abating ISIS, but has not eradicated them completely. Scholars and the
media suggest that ISIS will return with insurgency campaigns as it has done in the past (Burke
2017).
Albania
Background
Between 1967 and 1990 Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha declared Albania an
atheist country and banned all religions. However, after the fall of communism in the 1990’s
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nearly 20 Arab Islamic foundations settled into the Western Balkans region. The vast majority of
these groups established an extremely strong presence in Albania (Shtuni 2015). They were able
to gain public support by sponsoring the construction of mosques and provide educational
scholarships to Albanian Muslims who engaged in the promotion of Islam (Shtuni 2015). Many
of these foundations were later found responsible for recruitment and radicalization activities.
Before the Syrian conflict, very few ethnic Albanians traveled to Syria and Iraq to become
foreign fighters. However, between 2012 and 2015 research suggests that nearly 500 ethnic
Albanians from the Western Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq for the purpose of joining
ISIS (Shtuni 2015).
The dataset compiled by Adrian Shtuni (2015) examines 211 ethnic Albanians who
became foreign fighters in Iraq/Syria or have been arrested with recruitment charges between
2012 and 2015. The dataset does not include the women, children, and extended family members
that traveled with those attempting to join a terrorist group. Ethnic Albanian foreign fighters
range in age from 17-70, but the majority are approximately 30 years old. However, there is a
large age gap depending on what country the ethnic Albanian individual lived in prior to
becoming a foreign fighter. For example, in Albania, the average age of foreign fighters is 35.6,
meanwhile the average ages of ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia or Kosovo is nearly ten
years younger (Shtuni 2015).
During a briefing in February 2016 on U.S. Secretary Kerry’s travel to Tirana, a senior
State Department official reiterated that the Western Balkans is an environment that breeds
foreign fighters. They argued that high levels of youth unemployment and Islam with strands of a
politicized agenda are to blame for the rise in foreign fighters in the region (U.S. State
Department 2016a). While the State Department acknowledges that there are high levels of
violent extremism in the area, they also state that the Albanian government is working hard to
stop foreign fighters on their own. The State Department official states that
they’ve [Albanians] been quite successful over the last year with that and they’re trying
to export some of the strategies that they have used to other countries in the Balkan
region, including the work that they’re doing in communities to make common cause
between parents, educators, law enforcement, local Imams, et cetera, to make sure that
they know what influences young people are receiving. So we work very closely with
them on all of that (U.S. State Department 2016a).
Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security
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On the national level, Albania has tried to curb the foreign fighter phenomenon by
increasing indictments and laws against foreign fighters (Mejdini 2016a). This increase in arrests
and tougher legislation has curbed numbers of foreign fighters significantly (Mejdini 2016b).
Currently Albania criminalizes terrorist attacks, the collection, transfer and concealment of funds
for terrorist organizations, any transaction done with an individual on the UN sanction lists,
recruiting individuals to partake in terrorist activities and establishing or participating in a
terrorist activity. In 2016, nine individuals were found guilty of one or more of these charges,
and their sentences range from four-and-a-half to 18 years (Refworld 2016).
The Albanian government has expanded their State Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU),
which continues to work closely with the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to improve their training,
equipment and development. Specifically, they (ICITAP and DOJ) are focusing on the skills
needed for interviewing terrorist suspects. Additionally, Albania continues to work closely with
the EU and U.S. State Department to create a database that has the ability to collect fingerprints
that can be crosschecked against all other national databases in real time. The development of
this database could stop potential terror attacks in real time. However, Albania’s judicial and
police corruption and failing judicial system continue to delay law enforcement efforts and
progress overall (U.S. State Department 2016c).
Countering Terrorist Financing
Albania, as a member of the Council of Europe, is involved with the Committee of
Experts of the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(MONEYVAL) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Through these committees,
Albania is able to make the improvements needed to identify, trace, freeze and seize terrorist
assets. Additionally, by working in the Council of Europe they are able to enhance international
cooperation (U.S. State Department 2016c).
Countering Violent Extremism
The Albanian government continues to work extensively to combat violent extremism.
First, in 2015, Albania adopted its first national strategy against violent extremism. Then, in
2016, the Albanian government appointed a National Coordinator for Countering Violent
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Extremism who works closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). The government has acknowledged the role that education plays in fostering tolerance
and inclusion. Therefore, the government of Albania has developed a program on religious
tolerance that they would like to be implemented in schools (U.S. State Department 2016c).
International and Regional Cooperation
Albania is involved in numerous organizations that can assist in the process of fighting
terrorism through regional conferences and information exchanging techniques. Albania is a
member of the UN, the OSCE, NATO, Regional Cooperation Council, Council of Europe and
the Organization for Islamic cooperation. Membership in these associations are pivotal for a
country like Albania as they make strides in improving their judicial system (U.S. State
Department 2016c).
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Foreign fighters thrive in a fragile or failed state (Innes 2005). Although few would put
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in that category, recently, its inaccessible terrain makes it an
appropriate state for foreign fighters to hide. The European Commission stated that is
is easiest for terrorists to carry out these activities in states with rugged terrain, weak
governments, and low population density. In such places, terrorists can hide themselves,
as well as their supplies and infrastructure. Thus, these characteristics provide a recipe for
a terrorist sanctuary or haven (Innes 2005, 297).
These conditions, in addition to its proximity to the Middle East, makes Bosnia and Herzegovina
the perfect environment for the growth of terrorism. Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities have an
overwhelming presence of Muslims from third countries making it easy to hide in plain sight
(Innes 2005). Before 2005, the pervasive ethnic and political divisions within BiH, the role of
crime and corruption, and the changes in its demographics and administrative makeup made it
almost impossible to address terrorist threats domestically (Innes 2005). Recent literature on
terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sparse. However, the pieces of academic literature that
do exist are extremely revealing.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, post-9/11, was identified as a possible terrorist threat. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe argued that terrorism in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina is not only prominent because of publicized international groups like ISIS, but
because of the large role that domestic terrorism plays in the country. This knowledge has led to
a “proactive, but uneven approach to domestic and foreign counterterrorism” (Innes 2005, 299).
Terrorist cells that exist within Bosnia and Herzegovina, can easily disguise themselves in
cultural centers, prisons, and on the Internet. Therefore, it is difficult to actively fight foreign and
domestic terrorism in Bosnia. The ability for terrorist groups to hide in plain sight makes BosniaHerzegovina a sanctuary for Islamic terrorists and foreign fighters (U.S. State Department
2017a).
Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security
In 2014, Bosnia adopted legislation that sought to deal with threats posed by foreign
fighters. The government extended prison sentences for convicted foreign fighters to a maximum
of ten years and increased the maximum sentence for terrorist-related crimes to 20 years.
Additionally, the government introduced five-year minimum sentences to foreign fighter recruits
(Counter Extremist Project 2017). Still, there are major problems among law enforcement
agencies and the State Prosecutor’s Office, which makes coordination and cooperation difficult
when investigating complex terrorism cases.
The Bosnian Border Police work closely with the ICITAP and Foreigners Affairs
Services (FAS) to improve their techniques and foster development within the police department.
The Border Police use computerized software that collects passenger information at border
crossings and four major airports (Banja, Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo and Tuzla). They are able to
share the data collected with the European Union (through INTERPOL), which will give real
time information on each individuals in order to facilitate the detention of wanted individuals.
However, there are locations where screening using this database was not used (U.S. State
Department 2017a).
Countering Terrorist Financing
BiH is a member of MONEYVAL and FATF. However, in 2015, they were unable to
make enough progress in money laundering, the financing of terror, and failure to implement UN
obligation for targeted financial sanctions. Therefore, BiH made working with the FATF and
MONEYVAL a top priority. In 2016, they had made improvements such as freezing terrorist
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assets and working to harmonize their federal code with that of the EU (U.S. State Department
2017a).
Countering Violent Extremism
Bosnia’s religious communities (Catholic, Islamic, Jewish and Orthodox) work together
through the Interreligious Council to stand against acts of prejudice or extremism. Through this
Council, the Islamic community has made efforts to counter the misinterpretations of Islam that
can lead to extremism and violence. Bosnia has created a counterterrorism strategy to better
define their objectives in preventing future foreign fighters and the inevitable crimes they will
commit. The objectives of the BiH counterterrorism strategy include,
1. To conduct continued activities with the aim of deterring any support to terrorism,
terrorist activities or radical movements through public awareness activities directed at
positive communication.
2. To implement the Strategy in such a way as to prevent violations of fundamental
human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international conventions and regulations.
3. To improve interagency coordination and cooperation and develop capabilities in those
institutions or agencies that lack them.
4. To ensure monitoring and supervision of the Strategy’s implementing documents
(Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2013, 1).
Bosnia has reaffirmed its interest in the International Antiterrorist Coalition and has pledged its
allegiance to the EU for a continued harmonization of legislation in relation to terrorism and
foreign fighters (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2013).
International and Regional Cooperation
Bosnia is a member of the UN, INTERPOL, OSCE, Council of Europe, and Regional
Cooperation Council and aspires to be part of NATO. INTERPOL allows BiH to work closely
with the EU and have direct access to criminal databases. Furthermore, the Regional Cooperation
Council has its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Overall, BiH has harmonized its
terrorism criminal code with the UN and EU standards, which has fostered greater cooperation
with U.S. and European counterterrorism agencies (U.S. State Department 2017a).
Kosovo
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In 1998-1999, after the Kosovo War, major developments were made to the country’s
sociopolitical structure to improve the overall living conditions and reduce the risk of
radicalization in the region. Despite no prior history of religious militancy, the substantial
economic improvements made in Kosovo to stop radicalization were not enough. Kosovo still
became one of the main hubs of foreign fighters in the Iraq and Syrian conflict (Shtuni 2016).
Political Islam continues to grow, as does radicalization, recruitment and mobilization in
Kosovo. 3 out of every 4 Kosovan adults traveled to Syria or Iraq since 2012, with nearly 37
percent returning (Shtuni 2016). The average age of these individuals is between 17 and 30 years
old. However, the majority of foreign fighters are between 21 and 25 years old. Nearly 87
percent of Kosovar foreign fighters have completed formal education at the secondary level or
higher (Shtuni 2016). More than half of all Kosovar foreign fighters arrested lived in above
average economic conditions, while only 36 percent lived in poor conditions (Shtuni 2016).
Overall, Shtuni has confirmed that there has been little to no observable correlation between
income and education to vulnerability to Islamic radicalization and mobilization.
Radicalization, recruitment and mobilization are concentrated near Kosovo’s border with
Macedonia in two tiny municipalities of Hani i Elezit and Kaçanik (Shtuni 2016). More than
one-third of all male Kosovar violent extremists originate from this area, despite only accounting
for 14 percent of the total Kosovo population (Shtuni 2016). Foreign-funded extremist networks,
usually originating from Macedonia, continue to be active in these regions of Kosovo. Their
message focuses on spreading an extremely conservative and political form of Islam that is
conducive to radicalization. Local and radicalized Imams 2 focused on a global trend of the
oppression of Muslims and the war in Kosovo. For example,
In a video statement from 2010 posted online, a Kosovo Liberation Army veteran and the
first Kosovan to be reported killed in Syria in November 2012 provided his view on the
reasons behind the Kosovo War. ‘Those who fought us were crusaders. Those who think
that the Kosovo War was a nationalist war are wrong! [The Serbs] came here to fight
against Islam’ (Shtuni 2016, 8).
Statements like these reinvigorated Kosovar grievances against Serbia. Many young Kosovars
resonated with the difficulties that the Sunnis face in Syria because of the recent memories of
rape, humiliation and massive expulsion of Kosovar’s from their homes during the Kosovo War.
This has made the job of radicalized Imams much easier. Many Muslims in Kosovo already felt
2

A person who leads prayer in a mosque.
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they had a duty to act in solidarity with other Muslims under attack through defensive jihad
(Shtuni 2016).
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security
Kosovo’s legal framework, the Criminal Code of Kosovo, comes from the UN model on
counterterrorism. This charter criminalizes all form of terrorism, including assistance,
facilitation, recruitment and the failure to report terrorist activities. The code allows Kosovo
authorities to investigate and prosecute cases through means such as wiretapping and the use of
undercover agents. This gives Kosovo court system to use any tools necessary in the fight against
terrorism and shows their overall commitment to fighting terrorism related cases (U.S. State
Department 2016b). Furthermore, the U.S. State Department and Department of Justice have
acted as a mentor to Kosovo law enforcement and prosecutors on security related issues.
Representatives from Kosovo have attended countless training activities and conferences on
counterterrorism sponsored by the EU and the United States (U.S. State Department 2016b).
In March of 2015, Kosovo began new legislative procedures where individuals who join
or participate in foreign armies, police, paramilitary or para-police groups are subject to three to
15 years in jail. Additionally, the Kosovo government has enacted legislation where those found
guilty of organizing, recruiting, training, funding (directly or indirectly), or offering material
assistance to individuals with the aim of joining a foreign police or military will face between
five and 15 years in prison. Individuals who have committed, assisted, facilitated terrorist acts
including but not limited to participation in terrorist activities/groups or committing acts of terror
will face five years to life in prison. However, many individuals guilty of these crimes could not
be tried under the new laws if they returned to Kosovo before the new laws were passed, and
overall, prosecutors lack experience in trying such cases with the new legislation. Therefore, they
were tried under the much more lenient legislation in place since December of 2012 (Balkan
Investigate Reporting Network 2016). While Kosovo is extremely committed to fighting all
threats related to terrorism, they often lack the legal framework to do so effectively. National
investigators and prosecutors often have limited resources and experience in handling terrorism
related cases effectively (U.S. State Department 2016b).
The Kosovo Border Patrol (KBP) uses a system similar to the EU’s EUROPOL. The
computerized system is able to detect fraudulent identifications and is updated with individuals
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on who needed to be stopped or watched due to their possible connections with terrorist related
offenses. However, this system does not always function properly. Since Kosovo is not a
member of EUROPOL, Kosovo is unable to share information as easily and does not have access
to EU watch lists. In 2015, during the peak of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria to join
ISIS, KBP was able to block 10 people from leaving Kosovo and arrested them for their
participation with terror related activities (U.S. State Department 2016b).
Countering Terrorist Financing
Kosovo is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and has a national law
focused on the prevention of financing terrorist organization through money laundering. National
laws not only define terrorism finance, but also establish the way it should be reported to the
police in a way that complies with international anti-money laundering and counterterrorism
finance standards. However, Kosovo lacks the ability to monitor non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that may receive money from suspicious sources, rendering the national law virtually
useless. As of 2016, Kosovo has yet to successfully prosecute an organization or an individual
for financing a terrorist group (U.S. State Department 2016b).
Countering Violent Extremism
The Kosovo government focuses most of their energy pre-radicalization efforts on raising
awareness of radicalization through community initiatives and counter-narratives. Additionally,
Kosovo emphases on the de-radicalization and reintegration of once radicalized individuals (U.S.
State Department 2016b). The government began this initiative in November 2016 in hopes of
rehabilitating radicalized individuals by helping them to abandon their violent extremist
ideology. The process is done through the Kosovo government by assessment of the risks posed
by these individuals returning from foreign conflicts and provides them with support they need
(including but not limited to detention or psychological support) (U.S. State Department 2016b).
International and Regional Cooperation
Kosovo continues to struggle with membership to many international organizations, like
the UN, because countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence block its entry into
these organizations. For example, BiH and Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent
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country thereby making regional cooperation extremely difficult. Kosovo is not involved in any
regional initiatives like the Regional Cooperation Council for this reason. However, Kosovo does
have membership in the OSCE, and continues to work closely with the United States by
attending their conferences on violent extremism. Kosovo was selected as a Global Community
Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) recipient, which will fund initiatives at the
community level to reduce the risk of radicalization of youth.

Methods
The number of foreign fighters originating and returning to Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo is decreasing. In order to understand why, this paper will compare and
analyze the tactics and timeline each of these countries have taken to prevent foreign fighters.
Furthermore, the paper will consider the presence of any foreign power, like the United States,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the EU, as well as steps national and local
governments have been taking to curb foreign fighting and radicalization. Specifically, this paper
will compare the strategies of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to see the
similarities or differences in policy. To do this, information collected from research centers and
organizations that focus on terrorism and foreign fighters will be used. Additionally, news
articles published about the steps each country is taking, the role of foreign aid, and the declining
foreign fighter population will be utilized (U.S. State Department 2016b).
With this information, this paper will analyze if the actions taken by the Western Balkan
governments could have caused a similar phenomenon, drastically decreasing foreign fighters, in
all states. Theoretically, if countries are using different tactics to curb foreign fighters, it is
unlikely that they will all be successful, at the same time, in the same way. In this case, it is more
likely that the declining influence of ISIS has caused such a phenomenon. Therefore, this paper
will also examine the decreasing power and influence of ISIS territorially, economically and
their recruitment methods. In order to do this, academic literature as we as recent news articles
will be utilized.

Discussion
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Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have made enormous steps forward in
counterterrorism. Each country has made progresses in areas of legislation, law enforcement and
border security, countering the financial support of terrorists, countering violent extremism in
their own country, as well as participation in international and regional organizations. However,
all of these countries still need to make improvements because of their own disadvantages and
downfalls before starting to amend their counterterrorism departments. For example, Albania has
been dealing with corruption and a faulty judicial system for many years. Therefore, their
country still has many difficulties in processing individuals involved in terrorist activities. BiH
has difficulty because religious ties within the country are profound, making cooperation
between different religions difficult. Similarly, there are extensive problems between different
law enforcement agencies and State Prosecutors Office. This lack of coordination and
collaboration between parties investigating the same terrorist case leads to an overall inefficiency
of the system. Kosovo’s biggest challenge is their inability to be seen as an independent state
actor by all countries, and therefore, is unable to enter regional or international organizations.
This undermines their ability to share information with others, as well as gain vital information
from other countries in the region.
The policies in all the countries studied were established after the number of foreign
fighters leaving each state peaked in 2013. Many of these policies were unable to be
implemented until 2015, after the number of foreign fighters decreased dramatically. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the imminent application or promise of implementation of these different
counterterrorism strategies greatly impacted the number foreign fighters across all studied
countries. Still, these policies are a positive foundation for Albania, BiH and Kosovo to ensure
that if the number of foreign fighters begins to rise again, they will be ready legally, financially
and socially to counteract this phenomenon.
Not only were these policies enacted after the peak of foreign fighters, but the overall
trend of foreign fighters decreased and maintained similar trends across all three countries (see
Table 1). The policies and their execution vary dramatically across each state. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that these strategies could have produced a similar effect in the number of foreign
fighters regardless of the major differences in legislation. For example, all states have expanded
the definition of terrorism making it easier for someone to be prosecuted for a terrorist related
offense, and increased the number of years for which someone can be imprisoned. However,
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Albania still lacks the capability to prosecute successfully. Arguably, Kosovo has made the
progress in terms of countering financial support of terrorist or terrorist organizations, but they
are unable to monitor their own policies effectively, rendering the new legislation almost useless.
The most interesting trend between different national legislation is seen in the ways each
country counters violent extremism. The goal of creating policies in this realm is to reduce the
risk of radicalization before it is too late. Arguably, the results of the results of this policy space
will not be seen for years to come. However, Albania and Bosnia focus their attention on fighting
prejudice through education to stop radicalization in the Islamic community. Kosovo, on the
other hand, spends most of their attention on those who have already been radicalized and how
they may be de-radicalized to reenter society. These are very different approaches to fighting
extremism, and even in the short term, we would expect to see dramatically different results
across these three countries in terms of radicalization and travel to the Middle East.
The inconsistencies and shortcomings in the policies that have been enacted to curb
foreign fighters in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo cannot cause such similar and
consistent results in all three countries. The strategies taken vary from each country in terms of
basic objectives, time enacted, intensity and execution. Therefore, it is unlikely that these
policies are the reason for the decrease in the foreign fighter phenomenon in the Western
Balkans.
The argument that the fading power of ISIS as the driving force for the declining foreign
fighters in the Western Balkans is weak chronologically and economically. By 2014, ISIS had
control of Mosul and Raqqa, an oil rich town in Syria. At this time, they were attracting foreign
recruits, not only to fight on their behalf but also to establish a strong Caliphate. They needed to
recruit doctors, engineers and regular civilians to move and pay taxes to support this new Islamic
State that seemed to be thriving (AlJazeera 2017). Even so, we see a decrease in the number of
foreign fighters coming from the Western Balkans despite ISIS’s strong territorial hold and
recruitment techniques. Economically, the timing of ISIS’s amassed decline in wealth occurred
years later than the drop in foreign fighters coming from the Western Balkans (See Table 2). For
example, after 2014, the total revenue of the Islamic State declined from $1.9 billion to 870
million in 2016 (Heißner, Neumann, Holland-McCowan and Basra 2017). While this economic
downturn makes joining ISIS less appealing, it does not sufficiently explain the steep decline of
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foreign fighters in 2013-2014 from all three countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that the decline of
ISIS’s economic and territorial power is behind the decrease in foreign fighters.

Conclusion
Foreign fighters originating from the Western Balkans pose a major security threat to the
European Union, as well as the countries from which they originate. They posses the ability to
execute large and small scale attacks and remain unseen by their national governments until it is
too late. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo saw a dramatic increase in the number of
foreign fighters from 2012 to 2013. Therefore, each national government has considered or
enacted legislation in legislation, law enforcement ad border security, countering terrorist
financing, and countering violent extremism or radicalization. Since then, these countries have
seen a significant reduction in the number of foreign fighters in the region (2013-2014). It is
necessary to monitor, analyze and understand why there has been a decrease of foreign fighters
since 2015. Unfortunately, this paper is unable to determine what caused the decrease in foreign
fighters in 2012-2013. While it is clear that ISIS has lost a considerable amount of pull in the
Western Balkans, their power was still steady during the decline of foreign fighters. Similarly,
the policies to fight foreign fighters enacted by the Albanian, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Kosovo government differ dramatically from each other making it unlikely that they have caused
the decrease in foreign fighters. Similarly, the policies were enacted just before the 2014 and
have not all been effective combating foreign fighters making it unlikely that they are
responsible for the decrease.

Appendix
Table 1: Number of Foreign Fighters leaving Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia between 2012-2016
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Source: Balkan Investigate Reporting Network. 2016.
Table 2: ISIS’s Monetary Worth from 2014-2016
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